

## Message Text

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2008

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0209

EXDIS/ SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SALT: HIGHLIGHTS OF MAY 22 POST- MEETING DISCUSSIONS

REF: USDEL SALT TWO II 0205

SUMMARY. THERE FOLLOWS A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE MAY 22 POST MEETING DISCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. INDIVIDUAL AGREEMENTS: SHCHUKIN ( TO NITZE, A-282), BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION HE HAD RAISED IN THE MEETING CONCERNING INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS ON WHICH AGREEMENTS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN SEPARATION FROM A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. HE SUGGESTED THAT LOGIC REQUIRED THAT ONE EITHER BE FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATING OUT SUCH ELEMENTS OR BE AGAINST IT. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, US WAS PROPOSING A SEPARATE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT. HE THEREFORE HAD THOUGHT THE US SIDE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DEAL SEPARATELY WITH OTHER INDIVIDUAL MATTERS OF THE TYPE THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED FOR SEPARATE AGREEMENT AND ON SOME OF WICH THE US HAD ALSO TAKEN A POSITIVE VIEW. SHCHUKIN SAID HE WAS CONFUSED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S STATEMENT THAT THE US LINKED THESE SEPARABLE ELEMENTS TO A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. NITZE REPLIED THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT WAS TIME SENSITIVE. FOR THAT

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REASON THE US SIDE HAD PROPOSED SEPARATING IT OUT FOR INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT IN A PROVISIONAL AGREEMENT. THE OTHER ELEMENTS WERE NOT IME SENSITIVE AND COULD THEREFORE BE LEFT FOR THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

2. GRINEVSKY ( TO KLOSSON, A-276)  
FOCUSED ON THE THEME OF WHAT SEPARATE AGREEMENTS MIGHT BE CONCLUDED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. HE REMARKED THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD REPLIED TO ONLY ONE PART OF SHCHUKIN' S QUESTION THIS MORNING AND THAT US STILL HAD NOT MADE CLEAR WHETHER IN PRINCIPLE IT WAS AGREEABLE OR OPPOSED TO INDIVIDUAL AGREEMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US HAD PROPOSED " IMMEDIATE" NEGOTIATION OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON MULTIPLE RE- ENTRY VEHICLES. KLOSSON REPLIED THAT US HAD USED THE ENGLISH WORD " PROMPT" AND THAT WE ENVISAGED THAT THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON MULTIPLE RE- ENTRY VEHICLES WAS CLEARLY FAR MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, A BAN ON LAUNCHERS ON SEABEDS. GRINEVSKY DID NOT PRESS THE POINT. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MOSCOW WAS STUDYING THE US PROPOSAL ON FREEZING MULTIPLE RE- ENTRY VEHICLES.

3. " ADEQUATE" MRV/ MIRV LIMITATIONS: SMOLIN ASKED GRAYBEAL ( A-281) ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS IN THE US MAY 8 TH PROPOSAL AND ICBM/ SLBM LAUNCHER NUMBERS; SPECIFICALLY, WAS THE US PROPOSING A FREEZE ON PRESENT LEVELS. GRAYBEAL CALLED SMOLIN' S ATTENTION TO AMBASSADOR JOHNSON' S MAY 18 STATEMENT REGARDING THE MANNER IN WHICH ARTICLES, I, II AND III OF THE IA SHOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT, AND POINTED OUT THAT THESE NUMBERS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE ADEQUACY OF MRV/ MIRV LIMITATIONS: ONE WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE OTHER. SMOLIN SAID IT WOULD HELP THE SOVDEL AND MOSCOW TO EVALUATE THE US PROPOSAL IF THE US SIDE COULD CLARIFY WHAT T MEANT BY " ADEQUACY OF MRV/ MIRV LIMITATIONS," AND HOW THIS RELATED TO NUMBERS OF ICBM, MLBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS.

4. GEORGRAPHIC FACTORS: BELETSKIY ( TO ROWNY, A-279) SAID KLOSSON' S REMARKS CONCERNING GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS HAD LEFT OUT THE MOST SUBSTANTIVE AND IMPORTANT POINT, NAMELY, THAT THE US HAD STRATEGIC WEAPONS LOCATED CLOSE TO THE USSR AND CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON SOVIET TERRITORY. TRUSOV ( ALSO TO  
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0209

EXDIS/ SALT

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7. FITZGERALD ( TO TRUSOV, A-280) OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD LARGE NUMBERS OF SLCMS WHICH COULD STRIKE US COASTS WHILE THE US HAD NO SUCH WEAPONS. WHEN TRUSOV ASKED " FROM WHAT RANGES?", FITZGERALD SUGGESTED THAT A RANGE OF PERHAPS 200 MILES OFF THE EAST COAST WOULD PERMIT A SOVIET SLCM TO REACH THE ENTIRE POPULATED 150- MILE BELT. TRUSOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE US HAD DEPLOYED EXTENSIVE ASW DEFENSES EFFECTIVE TO DISTANCES WELL BEYOND THE 12- MILE LIMIT-- INDEED, HE THOUGHT, THEY MIGHT BE EFFECTIVE TO AT LEAST 600 MILES. CONSEQUENTLY, SOVIET SLCMS DID NOT POSE A THREAT TO US CITIES, ESPECIALLY SINCE THEY WERE NOT DESIGNED TO STRIKE LAND TARGETS BUT RATHER SEABORNE TARGETS. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET SIDE WAS NOT PROPOSING LIMITS ON ASW. FITZGERALD NOTED THAT, REGARDLESS OF ASW EFFECTIVENESS, THE FACT REMAINED THAT, IN PEACETIME, THE WATERS 200 MILES OFF THE US COAST WERE INTERNATIONAL WATERS. THUS, EVEN THOUGH DETECTED, SOVIET SUBMARINES COULD ENTER THESE WATERS AT WILL AND POSE A SURPRISE ATTACK THREAT TO US CITIES. CONSEQUENTLY, SLCMS GAVE THE SOVIET SIDE A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND CONTRIBUTED TO INSTABILITY.

8. ASMS: CHULITSKY ( TO IFFT/ PEREZ, A-278) REFERRED TO TRUSOV' S PRESENTATION ON AIR- LAUNCHED MISSILES AND ASKED WHY US SIDE HAD SELECTED A 3,000 KM RANGE AS THE CUTOFF

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FOR SYSTEMS WHICH SHOULD BE BANNED. AFTER GIVING HIM RATIONALE FOR THIS PARTICULAR CRITERION ( I. E., CONSIDERATIONS OF AIR DEFENSES AND PRESENT ASM INVENTORIES), CHULITSKY WAS ASKED FOR THE SOVIET VIEW-- WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE HAD DIFFERENT VIEWS AS TO RANGE THESE SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE AMERICAN SIDE. IFFT NOTED TO CHULITSKY THAT TRUSOV SEEMED TO BE ADVOCATING A PROHIBITION ON ASMS OF CONSIDERABLY SHORTER RANGE THAN 3000 KM. CHULITSKY BEGGED OFF ANSWERING, STATING THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION FOR THE EXPERTS. JOHNSON

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